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13.1  Introductory Remarks 
It is commonly said that wage control programs are much easier to 
formulate and to administer than price control programs. The reasons 
given are that consumer and producer products and services are much 
more heterogeneous than labor inputs, and pricing practices are much 
more diverse than pay structures. While there is much truth to these 
comparisons, the difficulties of  formulating an effective and workable 
program on the pay side are easily underestimated. The formulation of 
pay change measurement rules is complicated by two major factors: (1) 
the existence, and increasing relative size, of many types of  labor com- 
pensation other than straight hourly pay and (2) the existence of  many 
types of  salary structures and plans. 
These complications create problems for any economic analysis requir- 
ing measurement of  labor cost. They are, however, especially problem- 
atical  in  the formulation of  wage limitations in  a controls program. 
Whether the program is voluntary  or mandatory (more realistically, 
regardless of  where it is located on the voluntary-to-mandatory spec- 
trum), issues of  equity and universal comprehension of  the rules of the 
game are paramount. If such issues could be ignored, the straightforward 
economic objective of  such programs+ontrolling  labor cost1--would be 
adequately served by a definition of  labor compensation that is no dif- 
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ferent from that employed in any other economic analysis; there would 
be no special measurement issues and no purpose for this paper. 
This objective, however, is inevitably compromised by  the need to 
eclicit and to maintain public support and cooperation, which require at 
least the appearance of equitable treatment of different employee groups 
(e.g., managementhonmanagement and unionhonunion). Equity con- 
siderations are central to “incomes policies” (controls on types of  in- 
comes-labor  compensation, profit, rent, and interest) commonly em- 
ployed in Western European countries, and they have also inevitably 
crept into the price and wage control programs adopted in the United 
States. Indeed, neutrality with respect to laborhonlabor income shares 
was a basic tenet of  all three programs of  the last two decades:  the 
Kennedy/Johnson guideposts, the Nixon controls, and the Carter pay/ 
price standards. 
Employer cooperation also requires that the rules stipulate a clear goal 
that can be attained through standard compensation-administration pro- 
cedures. Requiring firms to control costs that are substantially beyond 
their control can erode cooperation. 
These issues of equity and administrative workability interact with the 
two pay program complications listed above (multiple types of compensa- 
tion and multiple types of  salary structures) in a way that makes the 
measurement of  labor cost more problematical in a controls program 
than in other types of  labor market analyses and programs.  Controls 
programs confront all of  the usual measurement problems, plus many 
others. These measurement problems provide the focus of  this paper.2 
In the following discussion, we relate the resolution of the measure- 
ment issues in Phase I1 of  the Nixon administration’s Economic Stabiliza- 
tion Program (ESP) and the first year of the Carter administration’s Pay 
and Price Standards P~ogram.~  The first program was administered by the 
tripartite Pay Board and was constrained by legislative  mandate, whereas 
the Carter administration’s program was based on an executive order and 
therefore was,  at least  initially,  relatively unconstrained  by  external 
factors. We ignore the two ESP freezes. We also devote little attention to 
Phases I11 and IV of the ESP and the second year of the Carter program, 
since they essentially constitute periods of  gradual decontrol (the first 
administered by  the Cost of  Living Council and the second, in effect, 
engineered by the Pay Advisory Committee). 
In section  13.2, the labor cost measurement concept in a controls 
program is placed in the context of the cost-push theory of  inflation and 
the theory  of  production and cost minimization. In section  13.3, we 
discuss issues involving the coverage and treatment of  nonwage com- 
pensation. In section 13.4, we deal with the index number issues that arise 
in choosing a method for calculating compensation rate changes. Section 
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13.2  Modeling Controls 
13.2.1  Cost-Push Inflation and Measurement Rules 
The objective  of  the labor cost controls programs  adopted in  the 
United States has been to mitigate cost-push pressures on product prices. 
The underlying behavioral description of the firm is typically based on a 
proportional markup of prices over unit  which in turn can be based 
on the theory of production and cost minimization. The cost function, C, 
of  an input-price-taking firm is defined by5 
C(w,  r,  q)  = Min [w  .e  + r .  z  1 q I  F(t,  z)], 
where w is a vector of compensation rates for different types of labor, r is 
a vector of  prices of other inputs (e.g., rental rates for capital and prices 
of intermediate goods), q is output, t is the vector of labor inputs, z is the 
vector of nonlabor inputs, and F is the production function. 
Our exposition can be simplified  without loss of any essential aspects if 
we assume that the production function is homogenous of degree one, in 
which case the cost function can be structured into the multiple of output 
and a unit cost function, c (Shephard 1970): 
f,z  (1) 
(2)  C(w,  r,  4)  = c(w,  r)  .q. 
The markup theory of  price behavior is then described by the following 
equation: 
(3)  p =  OL .  c(w,  r), 
where  OL  is a markup factor. By converting to logs, 
(4)  lnp = In  OL + lnZ(1n w,  In r)  ,4 
and differentiating with respect to time, we obtain the corresponding 
expression for the rate of  inflation: 
where a dot over a variable indicates a time derivative (i.e. ,$p  is the rate 
of change of the product price), ands,(w, r)  andsi(w, r)  are, respectively, 
the shares of types of  labor inputs and nonlabor inputs in total costs.’ 
Equation (5),  in the spirit of the cost-push theory of inflation, allocates 
the rate of  increase of  price to rates of  increase of  cost components, 
as well as the rate of  change of  the markup factor. A comprehensive 
controls program would therefore place an upper limit on the rate of 
change of each of the cost components and the markup factor. Alterna- 
tively, a control could be placed on some of the input prices (e.g., labor 
compensation rates) as well as the rate of increase of price itself, $p,  in 426  J. Stuart McMenamMR. Robert Russell 
which case the other (nonlabor) cost components would implicitly be 
controlled by the limitation on price increases. In either case, one possi- 
ble guideline for labor cost is 
The principal problem with the control rule  (6) is that it does not 
provide flexibility for relative compensation rates to change; for all rates 
for which the constraint is binding, relative Compensation rates must 
remain fixed. This inflexibility exacerbates the problem of  induced in- 
efficiencies, particularly in the case of occupational shortages. Of course, 
one could  adopt different upper  bounds for different  types of  labor 
inputs, but the task of  deciding on all of  these  limitations would be 
exceedingly difficult for anything but a trivial partition of the labor force. 
Reflecting these facts, controls program have typically placed restrictions 
on some aggregate measure of labor cost. Permitting firms to comply with 
a limitation on an index of  labor cost affords them the opportunity to 
change relative compensation rates in response to changing market con- 
ditions while meeting the control objective of  limiting total labor cost. 
The question is: Where does this index of  labor cost come from? A 
natural measure is the second set of terms in equation (9,  with the share 
weights normalized to sum to unity: 
(7) 
where 
is the share of  labor-type i in total labor cost. 
There does not in general exist an aggregate labor compensation rate 
(a theoretically consistent aggregation rule for compensation rate levels) 
corresponding to the continuous measure of change in (7); integration of 
the left-hand side of  (7) results  in  a  function of  both  w and  Y.  An 
aggregated compensation rate exists if  and only if  the unit cost function 
can be written as 
(8)  c(w,  Y)  = t[W(w),  r]. 
In this representation, the function W can be interpreted as the aggrega- 
tion rule (or index specification), and W(w)  is the aggregate compensa- 
tion rate. This construction is possible if and only if compensation rates of 
various types of labor are separable from prices of  other inputs-i.e.,  if 
and only if  labor price frontiers are independent of  the prices of  other 427  Measuring Labor Compensation in Controls Programs 
inputs (Blackorby, Primont, and Russell 1978, p. 70). Under homothetic- 
ity-but  only in this case-this  condition is equivalent to separability of 
labor inputs from other inputs in the production function (Blackorby, 
Primont, and Russell 1978, p. 89). This in turn requires that technical 
rates of substitution between labor inputs are independent of the quanti- 
ties of  other inputs. Needless to say, this is a strong restriction. 
If  the conditions for aggregation across compensation rates are sat- 
isfied, the cost-push equation can be written as 
(9) 
where 
sL[W(w),  r] is labor's share of total costs, and $(w) is the share of the ith 
labor input in total labor cost. The aggregate compensation rate control 
rule is then 
The difference between control rules (7) and (11) is that the share 
weights in (7) depend on nonlabor input prices as well as labor compensa- 
tion rates. Thus, in principle inequality (7) requires more information 
than (11); however, the required information about all price levels is 
embodied in  the share weights, and in both  cases data on shares of 
individual types of labor inputs suffice to construct the aggregate rate of 
change-in  the continuous case. In practice, however, aggregate com- 
pensation changes must be constructed from discrete data. If the aggrega- 
tion condition in  (8) is satisfied, such constructions are naturally and 
trivially given by 
(12)  Ww(4)l~~[W(~o~l  -  1 5 P  7 
where w(fo)  and  w(rl)  are the compensation rate vectors in the base 
period and terminal period, respectively. 
Alternatively, the discrete time control rule can be constructed by 
taking a discrete approximation to (7) or (11). In general, however, such 
discrete approximations may not themselves be derivable from a well- 
behaved cost function; moreover, discrete indexes of  the form (12) are 
not in general functions of share weights and percentage rates of change 
of individual compensation rates. (See section 13.4 for additional discus- 
sion of  these issues.) In any event, the exposition that follows is some- 
what more evocative if we assume the existence of a labor cost aggregate, 428  J. Stuart McMenaminIR. Robert Russell 
W;  the reader can easily modify the arguments for the case where this 
condition is not satisfied. 
13.2.2  Technological Change 
If  the state of  technology is not invariant, the markup rule is 
The exposition thus far has ignored the effect of technological change. 
(13)  p =  (Y ’  C(W,  Y, T), 
where T  is an index of the state of technology (i.e., total factor productiv- 
ity) and c is decreasing in T.  If  compensation rates are separable not only 
from other input prices but also from the state of  technology, then the 
unit cost function can be written as 
(14)  C(W,  r,  T) = t[W(w),  Y,  TI. 
Under the maintained assumption of homogeneity, this separability con- 
dition is eqivalent to Hicks neutrality of  technological change with re- 
spect to labor inputs (Blackorby, Lovell, and Thursby 1976). In this case, 
introduction of technological progress simply adds a term to the cost-push 
equation (9). 
If  the neutralityheparability condition is not satisfied, the unit cost 
function image is 
(15)  C(W,  Y,  T) = t[W(w,  T), r,  TI. 
In this case, the change in the aggregate compensation rate is given by 
where E(W,  T)  is the elasticity of  labor costs with respect to the state of 
technology. Thus, a rule of the type in inequality (11) would allow larger 
compensation increases in those firms with larger elasticities or more 
rapid rates of  technological change, since the second term on the right- 
hand  side  of  equation  (16) is  negative  when  there  is  technological 
progress. 
Indeed, many argue that the allowable compensation change should be 
sensitive to rates of  productivity growth. To the extent, however, that 
dispaaities in rates of technological progress are attributable to differen- 
tial rates of capital formation and to differences in the potential scope of 
innovation, this approach is inequitable and distortionary; with competi- 
tive labor and product markets, high productivity growth rates tend to be 
reflected in lower rates of price increases rather than higher rates of wage 
increases. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the disparities reflect differences 
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tions, an aggregate labor cost control rule that limited (16) might be more 
appropriate. In a practical vein, however, there is no way that controllers 
can discern those cases in which larger wage increases were granted in 
return for acceptance of  labor-saving technological progress. 
13.2.3  Incentive Pay 
More vexing are the problems raised when rates of labor compensation 
include some form of incentive pay. There are two general types of such 
programs: (1) group productivity plans and (2) individual worker incen- 
tive plans (such as piecework pay). 
In a group productivity plan, the hourly compensation of  a group 
member depends on measured group performance, and group perform- 
ance depends on the level of  group effort and the state of  technology. 
Thus, a simplified statement of  the group compensation rate is 
(17)  wi(wi,  Ti,  Ti) = wi + bi[Yiei(ri),  Ti]  7 
where wi is the hourly wage rate, bi is the hourly productivity bonus 
function, yi is the incentive rule parameter, ei(yi)  is the level of  group 
effort, and T~ is a group-specific  measure of  technology.8  The presumption 
of  such plans is that effort, ei(yi),  and therefore group productivity is 
increasing in yi  .  Further, if the increased worker efficiency  induced by the 
plan outweighs the additional compensation generated by the plan, unit 
costs are reduced by  its introduction; that is, the unit cost function is 
decreasing in yj  ,  at least over some interval, and in particular unit costs 
are lower for some positive yi  than when yj  = 0. 
Over time, the hourly wage rate, the incentive rule parameter, the 
level of  effort, and technology may all change. The rate of  change of 
hourly compensation for a group is 
and the change in the aggregate labor compensation rate is 
Corresponding to this decomposition of  W(w)lW(w),  there are several 
possible control rules, three of  which are 430  J. Stuart McMenamidR. Robert Russell 
and 
The first of  these rules is typically the strictest, charging employee units 
for all increased bonus payments as well as hourly wage gains; the second 
charges against the guideline only those increases in bonuses that are 
attributable to changes in technology and in the incentive plan param- 
eters, forgiving those that are attributable to increased group effort; the 
last ignores all changes in compensation rates attributable to the group 
productivity plan and hence is the most liberal of  the three rules. 
Choosing among these three rules was a matter of great controversy in 
both the Nixon controls program and the Carter standards program. The 
issue centers on the apparent conflict between the objectives of promot- 
ing economic efficiency and productivity growth (for minimizing induced 
inefficiencies) on the one hand, and the objective of  controlling labor 
costs on the other. To the extent that the group productivity plan induces 
workers to become more efficient and to the extent that the resultant 
bonuses do not overcompensate for those gains, the increases generated 
by  the plan should be excluded from the measurement of  labor com- 
pensation. Under these conditions, the most liberal rule, inequality (22), 
would still be effective in controlling unit costs (and hence prices under 
the markup rule [3]). 
There are, however, two problems with this rule. First, there is good 
reason to be skeptical about the incentive effects of  group productivity 
plans, because of  the free rider phenomenon. Improvements in group 
productivity attributable to the increased diligence of any one member of 
the group are shared among all members, and each member benefits from 
group productivity improvements whether or not he makes a contribu- 
tion. Consequently, looked at from the perspective of  individual self- 
interest, there may  be  little reason  for such plans to improve group 
productivity. The counterargument is that individual workers are likely 
to respond to peer group pressure to perform effectively. Clearly, the 
severity of  the free rider problem is sensitive to the size of  the group. 
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence about the effectiveness 
of  such plans; most of  the evidence is anecdotal. 
Second, there are economic arguments suggesting that the increased 
productivity  attributable  to  technological change  should  be  charged 
against the standard. In most industries, growth in total factor productiv- 
ity  is  an  ongoing phenomenon  because  of  technological change  and 
capital investment. As noted above, providing higher allowable com- 
pensation rate increases for workers in industries with more rapid tech- 
nological progress and more capital investment is inequitable and fails to 
simulate market processes (in which relatively rapid rates of productivity 431  Measuring Labor Compensation in Controls Programs 
growth tend to be reflected in relatively slower rates of  inflation rather 
than relatively higher rates of growth of  labor compensation). If it were 
possible to separate the productivity gains attributable to induced group 
effort from those attributable to technological progress and capital in- 
vestment, there would be no problem, and rule (21) could be used. In 
practice, however, such distinctions are impractical; trained econometri- 
cians could construct models and perform experiments that could be used 
to infer such  dichotomizations,  but  it  is not  possible to construct  a 
reasonable set of  rules that companies can follow in distinguishing be- 
tween the two sources of productivity gains.  lo 
For these two reasons-the  free rider problem and the measurement 
problem-no  exception was provided for group productivity plans in the 
Carter Pay and Price Standards Program. Immense lobbying pressure- 
both directly and through the Congress-pressured  the Council on Wage 
and Price Stability into the formulation of a tightly worded exception for 
group productivity plans (i.e., one that required a reasonable assurance 
that the bonuses were conditional on increased worker effort) ,  but its 
promulgation was effectively blocked by the Pay Advisory Committee. In 
any event, the issue of exemptions for group productivity plans in today’s 
economy  is  not  of  critical importance,  because  these  plans  are un- 
common. (Much more common are incentive plans for which the per- 
formance criterion is not in terms of  physical output; see section 13.3.) 
Such plans were even more uncommon  in  1972, when  the Congress 
mandated an exception for them in the ESP. 
A feature of the control rules (21) and (22) is that, despite the exclusion 
of  compensation increases attributable to productivity improvements, 
the base  compensation rate,  wi(wi ,  yi,  T~),  includes all compensation, 
including base group productivity bonuses. This makes sense. The pur- 
pose of  these exclusions is to encourage future productivity gains, and 
punishing workers for past gains in productivity would be inequitable. 
Moreover, workers may well in the past have given up fixed wage in- 
creases in return for the incentive plan. (This is, of course, less likely to be 
true for unions, which traditionally resist any type of  incentive pay. At 
any rate, such plans are rare for union workers.) 
One of the two problems associated with group productivity exceptions 
is eliminated in the case of  individual worker incentive plans, such as 
piecerate compensation payments. Such programs can be modeled by 
(23)  wij(wi, yi,  ~i)  = mi + bi[yi,  ei,(yi)>  ~il, 
where wij is the total hourly compensation rate for the jth worker in the 
ith group, and eij is the level of  effort of  that worker induced by  the 
incentive rate for the ith group, yi . If  all compensation is in the form of 
piecework pay, the first term of  (23) vanishes, and if the worker receives 
only fixed compensation, the second term vanishes. 432  J. Stuart McMenaminIR.  Robert Russell 
In this  case, assuming sufficient structure to aggregate across em- 
ployees within each group, the rate of change in the group compensation 
rate is given by 
where s$ is the share of workerj  in the total labor cost for group  i. Further 
aggregation is then possible, using equation (10). 
As in the case of group productivity plans, three possible control rules 
are obtained by (1) controlling all four terms in (24), (2) eliminating the 
third term, or (3) eliminating the last three terms. The first of these rules 
is the most stringent, charging all compensation increases against the 
guidelines; the last is the most lenient, excluding all changes in incentive 
payments; the second is intermediate, excluding increases in compensa- 
tion attributable to demonstrable increases in individual worker produc- 
tivity, but counting against the guideline increases attributable to changes 
in  the  piecework  formula  and  changes attributable  to technological 
advance. 
Although the free rider problem does not exist for individual worker 
incentive programs, the problem  of  separating productivity improve- 
ments attributable to increased worker effort from those attributable to 
the ongoing process of capital investment and technological change is still 
relevant. All piecework payments were legislatively excluded from the 
purview of  the ESP. The Carter program excluded compensation in- 
creases demonstrably attributable to increased output per hour. 
Additional measurement problems, which are complicated by the con- 
trol program imperatives of equity considerations and the need to make 
the rules understandable and workable, are created by two factors: (1) 
the need  to define precisely the compensation  rates,  w,  taking  into 
account the diverse types of  compensation payment, and (2) the need to 
specify an aggregation technique. These two measurement problems are 
discussed respectively in sections 13.3 and 13.4. 
13.3  Treatment of Nonwage Compensation 
In  the  preceding  section, we  dealt  with  compensation  as  a single 
numerical entity. In fact, compensation comes in many diverse forms. In 
this section, we discuss three major types of  compensation other than 
hourly wages and the measurement issues that arise in designing control 
rules to cover them. The first major category is incentive pay, including 
bonuses and profit-sharing plans (usually associated with management 
groups). A second category, future value compensation, includes long- 
term incentive plans involving the issuance of  awards where cost and 
value will  not be  known until some future time. The final and most 433  Measuring Labor Compensation in Controls Programs 
important category is fringe benefits, such as medical insurance  and 
pension plans. 
13.3.1  General Issues 
Administrators of  controls programs face three general issues in the 
treatment  of  nonwage  compensation: (1) whether  a  particular  item 
should be covered, (2) whether the item should be measured in terms of 
employer costs or employee benefits, and (3) whether the rule should be 
applied  separately to each  component or to their  aggregate.  In  the 
context of the simple model described in section 13.2, the answers tend to 
be obvious; when the control issues of  equity and workability are taken 
into account, however, the answers are not so obvious. 
As noted in section 13.2, the issue of whether to include certain types of 
incentive pay is a real one. The issue turns on whether the incentive pay 
induces commensurate productivity improvements that offset the effect 
of  higher labor compensation. In the context of  the simple model of 
section 13.2, however, any rise in the aggregate compensation rate that 
does not have offsetting productivity effects should be covered, since it 
results in higher price. Moreover, so long as the constraint is binding, any 
uncovered item would provide an escape mechanism, and the induced 
substitution toward the uncovered form of compensation would be unde- 
sirable from the perspective of  economic efficiency as well as program 
effectiveness. Finally, exclusion of  selected types of  compensation can 
undermine public support for the program, particularly if  executives 
appear to benefit most from the exclusions (as is the case for many types 
of  nonwage compensation). 
On the other hand, inclusion of  some of these items requires complex 
rules, thereby  increasing the administrative  and reporting burden on 
firms and the monitoring burden on government administrators. In addi- 
tion, some forms of  pay are, to a greater or lesser extent, beyond the 
control of employers, and their inclusion can undermine support for the 
program. 
The general approach of both the Pay Board and CWPS was to cover 
all forms of  compensation. Both, however, excluded employer contribu- 
tions to social security, because they are beyond the control of employers 
and because  the legislated increases have differential impacts across 
groups of  employees. The Congress directed the Pay Board to exclude 
most fringe benefits from its measure of labor compensation but allowed 
for limits on such benefits if  the contributions made to support them were 
“unreasonably inconsistent” with the standards for wage or price stabil- 
ity. The Pay Board translated this general principle into some specific 
restrictions on the excludable fringe benefits (see the discussion  in section 
13.3.4). 
The second question is whether the nonwage items should be measured 434  J. Stuart McMenamin/R.  Robert Russell 
in terms of  the value of  the benefits received by the employees or by the 
cost to the employers. Of course, benefits and cost coincide in the case of 
wages and salaries, but they can diverge markedly for many types of 
fringe benefits (for example, changes in pension-funding laws or regula- 
tions can affect employer costs substantially without changing employee 
benefits). The fundamental objective of  controlling labor cost is clearly 
served by focusing on employer costs rather than employee benefits. In 
those instances, however, where the employer does not control the cost 
of providing a particular benefit, this approach can cause either equity 
distortions across employee groups or administrative bottlenecks as firms 
request exceptions on equity grounds. The Pay Board regulations and the 
CWPS standards were  designed  to embody  the general principle  of 
measuring the employer’s cost when that cost was directly controlled by 
the employer and measuring the value of  employee benefits when the 
costs were not directly controlled. 
The third question is whether the individual nonwage items should be 
treated under separate limitations or be aggregated with wages under a 
common limitation. Under a common aggregate rule, employers would 
have the flexibility to substitute from one compensation form to another 
without violating the overall standard. This flexibility would be absent if 
separate limitations were imposed on each compensation type, resulting 
in a stricter standard but one that would inhibit substitution. The general 
approach of both the Pay Board and CWPS was to place all compensation 
forms under an aggregate standard whenever possible. 
13.3.2  Incentive Pay 
A wide variety of  incentive pay arrangements are used in the U.S. 
economy. In some, such as those discussed in section  13.2, nominal 
amounts are paid based on quantity measures of performance; examples 
are piecework pay, unit-based sales commission plans, and some em- 
ployee group production incentive plans. Others proceed on a percent- 
of-value basis; examples are sales commission plans that are revenue 
based and profit-sharing bonus plans. Finally, some firms pay discretion- 
ary bonuses that are not tied to a specific performance-based formula. 
These plans have two characteristics that make their treatment in a 
controls program problematical. The obvious one, discussed above, is the 
danger that controls will interfere with the salutary incentive effects of 
such programs.  The second problem  is that employer costs of  these 
programs cannot be determined in advance. In fact, the primary rationale 
for such plans is that pay should be high when individual or company 
performance is good and low when it is not. 
One measurement approach would be to charge the ex post employer 
payout in full. The objection that this approach would stifle performance 
incentives is most credible for those plans that provide direct incentives to 435  Measuring Labor Compensation in Controls Programs 
individual employees, as in the case of  piecework and commission pay 
and productivity plans modeled for small employee groups. The argu- 
ment carries less weight for companywide plans, where the individual 
incentives are diluted. Moreover, in many cases the performance crite- 
rion bears little relationship to work performance-especially those that 
are based on revenues or profit rather than physical quantity or produc- 
tivity. 
On theoretical grounds, an ideal approach would be one that requires 
firms to design incentive compensation packages with an expected payout 
value  that will meet  the standard, where  the  expectations would  be 
determined assuming a common base performance. This approach would 
leave incentives intact. In applying such a prospective rule, however, it 
would be necessary to quantify the concept of performance, and this need 
raises a new set of  measurement problems for all but the most basic 
incentive pay programs. 
As noted in section 13.2, the pay generated by productivity incentive 
plans  was  legislatively excluded in the Nixon  program,  whereas the 
CWPS standard allowed companies with sales commission or production 
incentive  plans  to  assess compliance on the  assumption  of  constant 
physical volume. All other forms of incentive pay were inc!uded  at their 
actual value in the measure of labor compensation in both programs. The 
alternative of  excluding these payments would have created a gaping 
loophole in the pay standard for managerial employees." The Pay Board 
evaluated the plans prospectively on the assumption that its targets were 
fully achieved, whereas the CWPS standard evaluated them retrospec- 
tively. Because of  the considerable volatility of  profits, and hence of 
profit-based bonus plans, both programs allowed considerable flexibility 
in the choice of  a bonus base. 
13.3.3  Future Value Compensation 
The salient characteristic of future value compensation is that its value 
will not be known until some future time. In most cases, this type of 
compensation is used to provide long-run incentives to upper level man- 
agement. As such, it is relatively unimportant from the perspective of 
inflation impact. The justification for covering it in a controls program is 
based on equity considerations and promotion of public acceptance of the 
program by guaranteeing that management compensation is covered in 
all forms. 
The problem posed by covering future value compensation, of course, 
is that of evaluating its cost. Consider, for example, a stock-option grant 
providing an option to buy 500 shares at $40 per share any time in the next 
five years.  Until the option is exercised, the cost to the employer is 
unrealized and unknown. The employee may never benefit from such a 
grant if  the stock price never exceeds $40 over the exercise period. 
1 436  J. Stuart McMenamidR. Robert Russell 
In theory, an ideal approach would be to assign a market value to such 
awards when they are granted. This would measure both the opportunity 
cost to the employer (who could sell the awarded units) and the com- 
pensation benefit to the employee. In practice, such an assignment is 
difficult because of the absence of markets. For example, stock options 
are actively traded for only a handful of  major stocks, and the exercise 
periods of  marketable  options normally do not  exceed one year.  In 
contrast, option awards often have multiyear exercise periods and are 
often contingent on multiyear performance criteria, making the deter- 
mination of  a market value difficult to codify. 
Because of these problems, future value awards under continuing plans 
were treated as a separate pay item with a separate numerical limitation 
under the CWPS standard. This was the only case where a compensation 
form was segregated rather than included under an aggregate limitation. 
Awards under newly introduced plans were to be assigned a “reasonable 
value” and included with other pay items. 
The Pay Board treated qualified stock-option plans-those  qualifying 
for preferred  tax  treatment  under  IRS rules-differently  from  non- 
qualified plans. A separate standard limited the issuance of options under 
existing qualified plans to the average number issued during the three 
fiscal years before Phase 11. Nonqualified plans, on the other hand, were 
evaluated and added to wages and salaries. Issuances were evaluated at 
the difference between the option price and the market price (one IRS 
condition for qualification for preferential tax treatment is equality of 
option  and market  prices)  plus 25  percent  of  the market value  (the 
Board’s estimate of the discounted value of an option). In addition, if  the 
option was exercised during the control period at a price more than 25 
percent below market value, the amount above 25 percent was charged to 
labor compensation. 
13.3.4  Fringe Benefits 
Fringe benefits have become an increasingly large component of  em- 
ployer costs over the last two decades. Here, we consider the two major 
benefits, employer contributions for health insurance coverage and pen- 
sion plan funding. 
Health insurance costs have risen rapidly for two reasons: the wide- 
spread improvement in the coverage provided and the rapid medical cost 
inflation. The first factor is  controlled  by  firms but the latter is  not. 
Further, the timing and magnitude of employer cost increases vary across 
plans and insurance providers, depending on plan experience and other 
factors. As a result, it is possible for two firms to have radically different 
cost changes in a particular measurement period, although the benefits to 
employees are identical and remain unchanged. If  these costs are charged 
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cost increases (after the program begins) would have to anticipate these 
increases and grant lesser wage changes to remain  in compliance. If 
anticipations are correct, an equity problem across firms is created; if 
anticipations are incorrect, inadvertant noncompliance can result. 
Similar comments apply to pension fund costs. Pension funds are of 
two basic types: defined contribution plans, where the employer contrib- 
utes specified amounts to employee-specific  accounts; and defined benefit 
plans, which specify the future benefits an employee will receive. For our 
purposes,  defined contribution plans  can  be  treated  as current  cash 
payments, like wages, salaries, and bonuses. However, for defined ben- 
efit plans, current employer costs are determined by actuarial computa- 
tions based on planning assumptions about retirement ages, longevity 
after retirement, earnings growth rates, and rates of return. Thus, as with 
health insurance costs, the linkage between changes in employer costs 
and changes in employee benefits is broken. Further, a simple exclusion 
rule for unchanged plans will lead to obvious inequity problems, since 
some plans are indexed (terminal pay plans) whereas other plans pay 
fixed nominal amounts (flat rate plans). 
Thus, for both health insurance and pension plans, the employer can 
control the benefit rules but cannot control the cost of  providing the 
benefits. Under the CWPS rules, the increase in all employer costs was to 
be checked against the standard, but automatic exceptions were provided 
for excesses above the standard when benefit levels remained unchanged. 
This approach was equivalent to simply excluding these fringe benefit 
costs from  the labor  compensation  calculation when plans were not 
improved and costs rose at least as much as the allowable pay increase. If 
pension  or health-care  costs rose  less than  the guideline,  additional 
increases in other forms of compensation were allowed. The costs of all 
improvements in benefit levels were charged against the standard. Thus, 
the rule was a hybrid of  an employer cost restriction and an employee 
benefit constraint. 
As  noted  above, the Pay Board  standards for pension  and health 
benefits were looser than the wage and salary standard, because the 
Congress mandated exclusion unless this was “unreasonably inconsis- 
tent” with the anti-inflation objectives of the program. Companies were 
allowed to increase these benefits by  0.7 percent of  the total hourly 
compensation base. On average, this amounted to a 7 percent standard 
for fringe benefits (since fringes then accounted for about 10 percent of 
total compensation),  compared to a 5.5 percent standard for wages, 
salaries, and bonuses. The fringe benefit rules also allowed for em- 
ployees’ units to catch up when those units’ benefitkotal compensation 
ratios were below the national average and when their benefit increases 
for the previous three years were less than 1.5 percent of the compensa- 
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13.4  Salary Structures and Index-Number Problems 
The previous section discussed the issues entailed in construction of the 
vector of  compensation rates, w,  in the control rule (11). This section 
discusses the aggregation rule, W,  and the concomitant index number 
construction, a discrete form of  W/(w)/W(w)-alternatively,  a discrete 
approximation to inequality (7) or (11). 
As discussed above, the formulation of  workable rules regarding the 
construction of  w is  complicated  by  the existence of  many types of 
compensation and the need to preserve the appearance of equity and the 
administrative workability of  the program. Similarly, the formulation of 
aggregation rules is complicated by  the wide variety of  compensation 
practices and the varying dynamic situations firms experience; any chosen 
method will  limit the compensation increases of  different  firms and 
different employees in vastly different ways. 
Before  proceeding  to a discussion of  the possible approaches, we 
briefly describe the main types of  salary structures encountered in the 
economy. After analyzing the index number problems in section 13.4.2, 
we discuss the treatment of  cost-of-living adjustment clauses and time 
weighting in sections 13.4.3 and 13.4.4. 
13.4.1  Salary Structures 
Company pay plans vary in terms of the timing of pay rate changes and 
the salary structures of  the work force. In some companies, changes are 
irregular, but this is the exception. Most firms have annual or multiyear 
pay plans that are handled through salary administration branches of 
personnel departments. These are of three basic types. The first involves 
across-the-board adjustment of  varying amounts granted to the entire 
work force at common times-for  example, annually or semiannually. 
Equally common  are anniversary plans,  under which individual em- 
ployees are evaluated on a staggered  basis throughout the year,  and 
changes are made consistent with a general salary objective for that year. 
Finally,  there are multiyear plans under which increases are granted 
according to established formulas; these are usually associated with col- 
lective bargaining agreements. 
Salary structures also take on several characteristic forms. Production 
workers  typically are paid  flat  job  rates  once  journeyman  status is 
achieved, while less senior employees are paid according to formal entry- 
level-to-job-rate progressions. 
Supervisory employees and management employees are typically paid 
according to salary ranges. In most cases, the ranges are adjusted regu- 
larly, and an individual employee’s position in the applicable range is 
adjusted according to annual merit reviews, performance evaluations, 
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semiautomatic progression (step increases) up a salary scale, sometimes 
referred to as longevity increases. 
In all cases, individual employees move along salary scales or within 
salary ranges and shift from scale to scale as a result of promotions and 
demotions. Also, over time, the composition of the work force changes as 
work force adjustments are made. To design its salary program under a 
compensation standard, a firm must evaluate the dynamics of  its work 
force in light of the way employee groups are to be defined and in light of 
the rules to be used in measuring average changes. 
13.4.2  Indexing Methods 
In principle, the natural index number to be used in calculating aggre- 
gate compensation rate changes would be determined by the structure of 
the unit cost functions (and hence the structure of the underlying prpduc- 
tion function) of individual firms. In particular, a discrete form of  W(w)/ 
W(w)  5  P, 
(12)  W[~(~Jl~W[w(~o~l  -  1s  P  > 
which is specific to each firm, would be the appropriate construction. 
The problems with this approach are obvious: First, the separability 
condition underlying the existence of such an aggregate is unlikely to be 
satisfied in most cases. Second, individual firms are unlikely to be able to 
ascertain the structure of their unit cost functions, even if this assumption 
were satisfied. Third, even if  individual firms could construct the ap- 
propriate  compensation rate, it would be virtually impossible for the 
government to monitor these constructions. 
In short, allowing the individual firms to decide on the type of index to 
be used would offer them a wide number of alternatives, and firms would 
naturally choose those constructions that serve their own purposes; in 
particular,  if  a firm wanted  to pay  more than the standard, it  could 
probably find a (bogus) index number construction that would allow it to 
do so. For this reason, controls programs typically stipulate the technique 
to be used in constructing changes in the aggregate Compensation rate. 
The three approaches that have been used, graphically described as the 
“double-snapshot method,’’ the “ice-cube method,” and “the melting- 
ice-cube method,” are in fact common calculation procedures. 
The double-snapshot method is simply a unit value construction. This 
involves a comparison of  average compensation rates (total compensa- 
tion divided by total hours worked) for active employees at the beginning 
and end of the measurement period. This method is simplest, most easily 
understood, and least ambiguous of  the three methods. Unfortunately, 
the limitations that this method imposes can be significantly affected by 
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The  ice-cube method adjusts for changes in the work force composition 
by using a fixed-weight index. There are, of  course, a large number of 
possible specifications of  fixed-weight indexes and a voluminous litera- 
ture on the subject. The theoretical construct, 
suggests a share-weighted index. 
The index number (10) is called a Divisia index (Divisia 1926), and 
there are a number of  ways to approximate it by a discrete index. One 
approach is to use base period shares; another is to use terminal period 
shares. The Tornqvist index uses the simple arithmetic average of  the 
base period and terminal period shares as weights (Tornqvist 1936; Theil 
1965). (Diewert 1976 has shown that the Tornqvist index can be derived 
from a homothetic translog aggregation function, W.)  The problem with 
the terminal period weights or the Tornqvist index is that the weights are 
not known until the end of  the control period. Consequently, the more 
common approach to the specification of  index number calculations in a 
controls program is to use base period shares as weights. 
One problem with the ice-cube method is that it requires companies to 
perform what  they  often consider to be complex calculations. Small 
companies especially find the very notion of index number construction, 
or  mix adjustment, to be too esoteric. A simpler method for dealing with 
composition changes is the melting-ice-cube, or continuing employee, 
method. Using this method, a firm computes average salary changes for 
those employees who are in the work force throughout the measurement 
period. New entrants into the work force and terminated employees do 
not enter computations. Thus, this is a unit value technique applied to 
continuing employees. Using this method to make the melting-ice-cube 
comparable with the other methods, it  is necessary to exclude those 
portions of compensation rate increases attributable to legitimate promo- 
tions and qualification changes. 
The characteristics of these three types of measurement techniques can 
be best illustrated by example. Consider a work force with four jobs, Job 
1  to Job 4, each with its own salary range (see table 13.1). Assume, for 
simplicity, that there is initially one person in each job, Person A to 
Person D. At the beginning of the measurement period, each person is 
near the top of the salary range for his or her respective job and no salary 
range increases are made. During the measurement period, Person A 
retires, and Persons B, C, and D are promoted upward sequentially into 
vacated positions, with salaries set at the lower end of each range. A new 
employee, Person E, is hired into the vacated position in Job 4. There are 
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Table 13.1  Jobs and Salary Ranges 
Job  Salary Ranges 
1  $30,000-35,000 
2  25,000-30,000 
3  20,000-25,OOO 
4  15,000-20,OOO 
increases. These movements and the before-and-after salaries are pre- 
sented in table 13.2. 
If  the unit value method is used, the average pay rate is $26,000 at the 
beginning of  the period and $22,000 at the end-a  15.5  percent decline. If 
the continuing employee method, applied to Persons B, C, and D, is 
used, these averages are $24,000 and $25,000, respectively, indicating a 
4.2 percent increase. If  the salary changes attributable to promotions are 
eliminated under the continuing employee method, the average com- 
pensation rate change is zero; this is the same result  that would be 
obtained using an index defined on the salary ranges. 
This example illustrates several points. First, in any company with 
salary ranges and a policy of  promotion from within-the  most common 
compensation structure for nonunion work forces-the  double-snapshot 
method will tend to understate both the average increase granted to 
continuing  employees and the weighted average  salary-range adjust- 
ment. The tendency for the turnover and promotion process to reduce 
measured average changes is called “slippage” by compensation adminis- 
trators, acd slippage values of  from 1 to 3 percent are common. Em- 
ployee groups with wide salary ranges and high turnover tend to expe- 
rience  the greatest  slippage, whereas slippage is relatively small for 
employee groups with flat job rates and little turnover. 
Second, the downward bias of the double-snapshot technique is even 
more pronounced for growing firms, since new employees in the lower 
ends of  salary brackets will further reduce unit value changes. On the 
other hand, work force reductions, which tend to be concentrated among 
Table 13.2  Workforce and Salary Changes 
Before 
Person  Job  Salary  Change  Person  Job  Salary 
A  1  $34,000  Retires 
B  2  29,000  Promoted  B  1  $30,000 
C  3  24,000  Promoted  C  2  25,000 
D  4  19,000  Promoted  D  3  20,000 
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low-tenure, low-paid workers in each range, work in the opposite direc- 
tion. 
Third, the continuing  employee  approach would tend to overstate 
average changes if  there were no adjustment for promotions and qual- 
ification increases. With such adjustments, this method would appear to 
approximate the fixed-weight approach.  Further, the continuing em- 
ployee  method  provides  a  simple operational  guideline  (e.g.,  grant 
across-the-board increases that are consistent with the pay guideline and 
follow normal promotional  practices),  but  its use  raises the difficult 
problems of  defining, tracking, and defending promotional increases in 
ex post compliance checks. (These problems are also serious from the 
controller’s point of view, since, for example, a formal distinction must 
be drawn between promotions and longevity increases.) 
Although there was much confusion about computational methods 
during Phase  11,  the  Pay  Board  ultimately  seemed to prescribe  the 
ice-cube method for both union and nonunion employee groups. The 
CWPS rules mandated the ice-cube approach for multiyear collective 
bargaining units (essentially requiring the construction of  a fixed-weight 
index of wage changes for jobs), but allowed companies to choose among 
the three  methods for single-year contracts  and nonunion  employee 
units.  This  choice-particularly  the  option  of  choosing the  double- 
snapshot method-undoubtedly  allowed average increases substantially 
above the standard for many high-growth companies, but CWPS was not 
able to obtain a quantitative estimate of  this effect. 
13.4.3  Evaluating Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
Cost-of-living adjustments (COLA), which have become increasingly 
prevalent over the last decade in response to high inflation rates, pose 
special problems for the measurement of  labor compensation in a con- 
trols program: the actual COLA payouts depend on future inflation and 
are therefore unknown at the time a collective bargaining agreement is 
signed. 
The Pay Board provided no special instructions for evaluating COLAs 
(other  than  time  weighting,  discussed below);  thus,  implicitly, such 
clauses could be evaluated retrospectively, and if unanticipated inflation 
threw  an  agreement out of  compliance,  a rollback  could have  been 
dictated by  the board. Because the Pay Board  evaluated only those 
contracts that were challenged by  one of  its members, there was no 
general need  to make prospective evaluations.  In fact, there was no 
challenge of  a COLA clause during Phase 11. 
At the time the Carter administration’s program was promulgated, 
however, COLAS  were a much more important phenomenon, and it was 
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required. The one adopted in the CWPS standards provided an inflation 
assumption to be used in evaluations of  all such clauses. The problem 
with this approach is a matter of  painful history. Because the actual 
inflation rate during the two years of the program substantially exceeded 
the rate stipulated in the rules for evaluating COLAs, complying  workers 
protected  by  these clauses could receive much higher increases than 
nonprotected employee units.Iz CWPS estimated that this factor aver- 
aged 1%  percentage points for all collective bargaining contracts signed 
during the first program year and 1% percentage points in the second 
year. Because some 40 percent of  union workers are not covered by 
COLAs, the  average  for  collective bargaining  units  so covered  was 
probably on the order of 3 percent. Indeed, the major collective bargain- 
ing agreements during the first year of the program did generate average 
annual increases of about 10 percent (using realistic inflation forecasts), 
three points above the pay ~tandard.’~ 
13.4.4  Time Weighting 
The numerical  wage  standards in  the Nixon  and  Carter programs 
essentially involved point-to-point comparisons of  wage rates. That is, 
the restriction was on the percentage increase in the average compensa- 
tion rate from the base period to the end of the control period. The path 
of  compensation rates  within the control period, i.e.,  the timing of 
increases, was irrelevant. In both cases, organized labor argued vigor- 
ously that time weighting of pay rate changes should be allowed. Under 
this approach, a 5 percent increase initiated on the first day of  the year 
and maintained throughout the year would be judged equivalent to a 10 
percent increase instituted halfway through the year. The essence of time 
weighting, therefore, is that any undershooting of the allowable pay rate 
path should be allowed to be “banked” and used later in the year. 
Time weighting as a general approach was rejected in both programs 
because of  the emphasis on the objective of  controlling labor cost. To 
take an extreme example, a 365 percent increase in wages on the last day 
of  a control year would be far more destructive to an anti-inflation effort 
than a 1  percent increase on the first day of the control period, but the two 
would be treated equivalently under time weighting. 
Although the Pay Board  rejected  the notion  of  time weighting in 
general,  it  did ultimately  allow time weighting of  COLAs.  This was 
justified on the ground that COLA payments are typically made with a 
lag, whereas fixed wage increases are typically paid up front, and this 
creates an inequity between units with COLAs and those without. In the 
Carter  administration’s  program,  however,  time  weighting was  not 
allowed for COLAs or for fixed wage increases. In some instances, this 
approach undoubtedly promoted front loading, or acceleration of  in- 
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13.5  Concluding Remarks and Afterthoughts 
On the basis of the above discussion of  the problems of  measuring 
labor compensation in a controls program and of our experience with the 
CWPS program, we offer a few concluding remarks: 
1. If  there is to be retroactive monitoring of pay increases and penal- 
ties for noncompliance with a guideline, an elaborate specification of 
rules and regulations is necessary. A simple numerical guideline worked 
well during the Kennedy/Johnson years because there was no systematic 
monitoring or enforcement; only one or two full-time equivalent profes- 
sional employees (at the Council of Economic Advisors) were involved in 
the program, and intervention by the administration was for the most 
part limited to presettlement jawboning in a few major collective bargain- 
ing negotiations. For the vast majority of the work force, the guidepost 
was effectively self-administered by  employers. 
In the Nixon and Carter programs, however, the ambitious monitoring 
effort and the attention given to the use of sanctions-fines  in the former 
and public stigmatization and debarment from government procurement 
contracts in the latter-resulted  in a complex set of  rules. Both began 
with relatively (indeed naively) simple notions of  labor compensation 
measurement, but business insistence on more and more specificity led to 
an increasingly complicated body of regulations and case law. The need 
for more rules and rulings is boundless, as each resolution of an ambiguity 
begets new questions and as each closing of  a loophole challenges busi- 
ness ingenuity  to find  a new  way  around  the guideline.  This is not 
uniquely a feature of  controls programs; an increasingly lengthy, de- 
tailed, and complex body of tax law and IRS rulings has built up over the 
years for similar reasons. But while the collection of  taxes is a generally 
accepted government activity, there is considerable dispute about the 
propriety  of  government programs to control wages and prices.  The 
growing body of regulations in a controls program therefore comes to be 
perceived as unduly onerous and even as evidence of the ultimate futility 
of direct government intervention both in the marketplace and in collec- 
tive bargaining for the purpose of arresting inflation. The weight of the 
rules and regulations becomes a burden that the program cannot bear- 
especially if  it is proclaimed to be “voluntary.” 
2.  An irony of  an ambitious controls program is that an inordinate 
amount of  effort is expended on the design of  measurement rules for 
types of  compensation that have but a trivial effect on inflation-epe- 
cially many types of executive compensation. This is an implication of the 
paramount need to promote the appearance of  equity-an  impression 
that appears, from the experience of the Nixon program, to be as essen- 
tial  in  a mandatory program as in a voluntary  one for building and 
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3.  A set of measurement rules does not exist that would avert vocifer- 
ous charges of inequity. Too many decisions about alternatives work to 
the advantage of  some and the disadvantage of  others. Both the Pay 
Board and CWPS were the subject of  much criticism on this ground. 
Ultimately, feelings of  inequitable treatment led, at least avowedly, to 
the labor walkout from the Pay Board and to erosion of  the grudging 
business support for the Carter program. 
4. A  program that is equitable (by some definition) under certain 
assumptions can  be indisputably  inequitable under  others.  The best 
example is the underevaluation of COLA clauses in the Carter program. 
Had inflation rates been close to the administration’s forecast at the time 
the standards program was promulgated,  the approach to evaluating 
COLAs would have been defensible. As it was, the problem of under- 
evaluation came to be seen as a severe unionhonunion inequity and, 
more than anything else, led to the erosion of  business support for the 
program.  (Although  nonunion employee  units had  the advantage of 
slippage in the double-snapshot calculation methods, this advantage was 
not nearly as important quantitatively as the underevaluation of COLA.) 
5.  Any successful incomes policy in the future will have to come to 
grips with the problem of evaluating COLA. Perhaps the only effective 
approach is to provide a ceiling above which total pay increases, including 
COLAs, are not allowed. Thus, COLAs in contracts entered into during 
the program would be required to be “capped.” This approach, however, 
amounts to the virtual abrogation of COLA clauses and would meet with 
extreme resistance from organized labor. It would seem that any attempt 
to enforce a ban on COLAs in a controls program would require legisla- 
tion. Thus, any successful wage control program in the future is likely to 
be a legislatively mandated one. 
Notes 
1. The theoretical justifications for this goal are the need to retard inflationary expecta- 
tions and to alter the (short-run) Phillips curve in order to lower the economic costs of 
anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary policies. These justifications can be elaborated on by 
appealing either to the theory of  informational  disequilibrium  (e.g.,  Lucas and Prescott 
1974; Phelps 1979) or to the theory of  implicit contracts (e.g., Azariadis 1975; Baily 1974; 
Gordon 1976; Okun 1981), each of  which can explain sluggish adjustment of  wages and 
prices to new equilibria. Such elaboration, however, would take us far afield of  the topic of 
this paper. 
2.  The focus on measurement rules avoids dealing with other important (and controver- 
sial) design issues, such as numerical standards vs. case-by-case review, economy-wide vs. 
sectoral guidelines, the treatment of special pay situations (such as tandem pay relationships 
and pattern  bargaining),  and exceptions criteria  for such things  as occupational  labor 
shortages. 446  J. Stuart McMenamin/R.  Robert Russell 
3.  Our knowledge of  the former is based on published materials; our knowledge of  the 
latter is based on first-hand experience. The  best sources for the ESP are Office of Economic 
Stabilization, Department of the Treasury (1974) and Weber and Mitchell (1978). (Also see 
Dunlop and Fedor 1977; Yoshe, Allams, Russell, and Atkin 1972; Mitchell and Azevedo 
1976.) The best reference for the Kennedy/Johnson guideposts is Sheahan (1967). Ulman 
and Flanagan (1971) describe wage-restraint programs in other countries. 
4.  This theoretical predicate is not essential. Everything  that follows could also be 
discussed  in  the context  of  a reduced  form price  equation that includes demand-side 
variables (such as income) in addition to input prices as explanatory variables. 
5.  It may seem peculiar to posit a model of input-price-taking behavior in the context of a 
controls program, since the controls would be expected to be applicable only in those cases 
where there is discretion in the setting of  the input prices. This approach, however, makes 
sense in a market characterized by collective bargaining; once a contract is signed, com- 
pensation rates are effectively determined for the duration of the contract (typically three 
years in major negotiating situations), and the managers seek to minimize costs subject to 
predetermined compensation rates. Similarly, in the “wage-wage model’’ of the inflation 
process (see Hall 1974; Okun 1981, chap. 3), nonunion wages tend to follow the pattern set 
by major collective bargaining agreements. Whether the controls programs should apply to 
the nonunion labor markets as  well as  to major collective bargaining negotiations is a matter 
of contention among economists. Whether or not it makes sense from a strictly economic 
point of view to restrict the guidelines to major collective bargaining negotiations, political 
realities require that the program be much more comprehensive. 
6.  The function ? is defined by Z(ln w,  In r)  =  c(w, r). 
7. That is, 
alnZ(In w,  Inr) -  dc(w,  r)  w,  -  wt e*  SAW,  r)  = 
ah  w,  aw,  c(w,  r)  c(w,  r,  4)  ’ 
where the last identity follows from Hotelling’s theorem (see Blackorby, Primont,  and 
Russell 1978, p. 32): 
8. For simplicity, we suppose that the group corresponds to a labor type, i; otherwise, 
the  notation would  be  unduly  cumbersome.  We  also ignore,  in this  formulation,  the 
problem of  distinguishing between work effort, e(yC),  and technology, Tran  important 
practical problem in the design of these plans. In practice, there are very few productivity 
plans that so explicitly relate labor compensation to the level of  group productivity. Most 
so-called group productivity plans in the real world are in fact little different from profit- 
sharing plans, which can result in higher rates of  compensation simply because of  higher 
product prices. The treatment of  these types of  plans is discussed in section  13.3. 
9.  At this point, we adopt the reprehensible practice of  writing notations for functions 
when we mean function images to keep the notation from getting out of  hand. 
10. Of  course,  an appropriately  constructed  group productivity  plan  might  induce 
technological progress within a reasonably defined group. For the most part, however, such 
plans are designed to promote increased worker effort rather than technological progress. 
11. The Carter administration’s standard was applied separately to management  and 
nonmanagement employee units; the ESP accorded firms sufficient flexibility in the choice 
of employee units to treat executives separately. 
12. Recall, however, the computational advantage accorded many nonunion employee 
units by allowing them to calculate wage increases using the double-snapshot technique. 
13. The COLA-costing assumption also promoted the design of  COLA clauses tailored 
around the assumption, such as triggered or other nonlinear COLA formulas. 447  Measuring Labor Compensation in Controls Programs 
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